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Eloy Garcia, David W. Casbeer, Dzung Tran, and Meir Pachter
Abstract—An operational relevant conflict between teams of
autonomous vehicles in the Beyond Visual Range domain is
addressed in this paper. Optimal strategies are designed in order
for a team of air interceptors to protect a high value asset and
block the attacking team at a safe distance from such asset.
The attacking agents take specific roles of leader and wingman
and also devise their own optimal strategies in order to launch
an attack as close as possible from the asset. The problem is
formulated as a zero-sum differential game between players
with different speed over two stages: the attack and the retreat
stages. For each stage the state-feedback optimal strategies of
each player are derived in analytical form.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the military, a migration is underway from conventional
forces into unmanned, modular, cooperative, and conse-
quently more manageable teams of assets. This process
requires additional planning and incorporation of new mod-
els, methods, and team strategies that leverage the new
capabilities and properties of these autonomous systems
[1]–[8]. It is also expected that a team of intelligent and
autonomous assets will face an opposing intelligent team
with similar capabilities and the same flexibility to leverage
cooperation on their own. This combat scenario will require
efficient command, control, and guidance strategies which
allow a team of autonomous systems to prevail and com-
plete specified missions in the presence of adversarial units.
Strategies which enable coordination and cooperation among
teammates should be devised as well in order to determine
the best course of action.
Mathematical analysis of conflict is performed by lever-
aging game theory. Game theory techniques are used to
design optimal strategies that are also robust to unknown
adversary’s actions. Controllers and decision making algo-
rithms designed based on this approach are able to adapt
to potential enemy actions in a rapidly changing battle
space and to take advantage of enemy’s deviation from
optimal solutions. The authors of [9] emphasized the need
for strategies based on game theoretic analysis to address
automated battle scenarios. The key aspect is to synthesize
Nash-equilibrium strategies where players do not obtain any
This work has been supported in part by AFOSR LRIR No. 18RQ-
COR036.
E. Garcia, D. Casbeer, and D. Tran are with the Control Science Center
of Excellence, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH
45433. Corresponding author eloy.garcia.2@us.af.mil
M. Pachter is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, Air Force
Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH 45433.
improvement in their performance by deviating from these
strategies. The papers [10]–[12] offer similar game theory
techniques for battle management. However, the previous
references concerning game theory analysis of combat opera-
tions employed static game formulations. In order to formally
address the dynamical aspect exhibited in autonomous air
battle management, the tools and methods of differential
game theory are needed [13], [14]. Differential game theory
is concerned with the analysis of non-cooperative conflicts
where the underlying processes are governed by differential
equations. Differential game theory has been successfully
applied for motion planning [15], [16] and, especially, for
analysis of pursuit-evasion games [17]–[24].
The problem considered is an attack-defense of high-
value stationary asset where a team of two Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles (UAV) is tasked to attack it while a team of two
interceptors tries to deny access and protect the valuable
asset. The problem takes place in the Beyond Visual Range
(BVR) domain. This is a highly relevant and practical sce-
nario involving several agents. We denote the attacking UAVs
as the blue team and the interceptors as the red team. The
problem is addressed in two stages, the attack and the retreat
stages. We pay particular attention to safety and survivability
of the blue team; hence, as they choose the mode of attack,
the leader-wingman roles are assigned. In the attack stage,
the leader’s role is to penetrate the area protected by the red
interceptors and attack the red entities while the wingman
flies in formation. In the retreat stage, the wingman is in
charge of protecting the leader while the latter is trying
to evade the weapons fired by the red interceptors. It is
important to note that due to this type of cooperation between
blue vehicles, it is possible for the leader to penetrate deeper
into the area protected by red interceptors knowing that its
teammate or wingman will aid him to escape. Consequently,
traditional weapon engagement zones (WEZ) become less
relevant in the design of cooperative tactics.
This problem was originally proposed in [25] where a
preliminary analysis was presented. The analysis in [25]
considers all air vehicles, blue UAVs and red interceptors, to
have the same speed. Also, the retreat stage was not formally
analyzed in that reference. In this paper we generalize
those preliminary results in order to consider players with
different speed. This generalization has important practical
applications by addressing the players’ sense of urgency in
the way human pilots usually approach such concerns. In
addition, in this paper, we provide a detailed analysis of the
retreat stage. Active defense of an aircraft is analyzed in
the presence of two attacker missiles and two defender mis-
siles. Finally, the developed autonomous battle management
method is exemplified in simulations. The sense of urgency
in terms of survivability of the blue team is incorporated and
the optimal strategies, which are obtained based on simple
motion models, are implemented in aircraft models that
account for both turning rate and acceleration constraints.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The conflict
between the blue and the red teams in the BVR domain
is formulated as a differential game in Section II. Section
III analyzes the attack stage where the air vehicles have
different speed and cooperative optimal strategies for attack-
defense of the high value asset are developed. In Section IV
optimal strategies for the retreat stage are presented. Section
V provides illustrative examples and conclusions follow in
Section VI.
II. THE BVR CONFLICT
A conflict between two UAVs, which are labeled as BL
and BW , and two air interceptors, which are labeled as R1
and R2, is considered. The stationary asset is denoted by Rs.
The blue team’s (BL and BW ) objective is to penetrate the
area protected by the red team (R1 and R2) and reach within
firing distance, ρs > 0, of Rs. The red interceptors are tasked
to block the blue team of UAVs by reaching a firing range
ρ > 0 with respect to a blue UAV. A red interceptor will
fire an air-to-air missile against a blue UAV located within
firing range ρ. The blue UAVs place a high value to their
own safety and, similar to the red interceptors, are equipped
with air-to-air missiles of similar range ρ. Hence, if a blue
UAV is within range of a red interceptor it will fire a missile
and then retreat to evade the red interceptor’s attack. This
engagement is illustrated in Fig. 1. The missiles’ range ρ is
typically longer than visual range, hence, the problem is to
devise corresponding tactics for a BVR combat scenario.
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Fig. 1. BVRT: Attack Stage
The blue team strives to reach as close as possible to
the red asset Rs in the presence of intelligent adversaries,
namely, the red interceptors. The red interceptors, in turn,
try to protect the asset and block the blue team as far as
possible from Rs. In order to balance lethality and safety,
the scenario consists of two stages: the attack stage and
the retreat stage. In the attack stage, BL engages either RS
or the red interceptors. BL immediately retreats after firing
weapons, whether it is against the interceptors or RS . This
sequence is shown in Fig. 2. In the retreat stage BW takes the
role of protecting BL by firing defender missiles to intercept
the missiles fired by the red interceptors against BL.
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Fig. 2. BVRT: Retreat Stage
In general, we consider ρs 6= ρ to allow the case where
BL is equipped with two different types of weapons: one to
launch against aircraft interceptors and one to launch against
static ground assets. In this work we assume an engagement
range ρ instead of a weapon engagement zone (WEZ) and
we also assume simple motion models for the blue and red
aircraft. Both assumptions are due to the nature of the BVR
problem under consideration as opposed to a close-range
conflict where dynamic constraints play a more significant
role. More importantly, by employing cooperative active
target defense strategies in the retreat stage, it is possible
for BL to penetrate deeper into the area protected by red
interceptors knowing that its teammate or wingman will aid
him to escape; thus, the WEZ becomes less relevant. This
means that ρ could be selected to be smaller than air-to-
air missile range and in accordance to active target defense
strategies. This level of cooperation between BL and BW
allows for tactics and strategies that are more aggressive and
lethal while avoiding loss of blue aircraft. Additionally, in
Section V, the state-feedback strategies obtained based on
simple kinematics will be used in aircraft models with both
turning rate and acceleration constraints. Those examples
highlight the great importance of synthesizing state-feedback
strategies for dynamic conflicts and the applicability and
effectiveness of these strategies in BVR scenarios.
III. THE ATTACK STAGE
A. Problem Formulation
In this section the attack stage of the problem is formulated
as a zero-sum differential game between the blue and the red
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Fig. 3. BL reaches a distance ρs with respect to Rs before being blocked
by any interceptor
teams. In the attack stage the players are Blue Lead BL and
two red interceptors R1 and R2 who protect the stationary
asset Rs. BL strives to reach an engagement distance ρs > 0
with respect to Rs and fire a missile/weapon to destroy Rs.
The interceptors R1 and R2 are tasked to block BL and deny
penetration of BL within a distance ρs of Rs. If either one
of R1 or R2 is able to achieve an engagement range ρ > 0
with respect to BL they will block BL by firing a missile
aimed at BL. If BL is blocked by R1 or R2, he will also
launch a missile against the interceptor located within range
ρ and retreat immediately since the interceptor has launched
a missile at him. On the other hand, if BL is able to penetrate
and reach a distance ρs from Rs then he will fire a weapon
aimed at Rs followed by retreat. For instance, Fig. 3 shows
an example where BL is able to reach a distance ρs from
Rs before being blocked by any interceptor.
Since Rs = (xs, ys) is static, the engagement zone of Rs
is defined as follows
Γ = {x, y|
√
(x− xs)2 + (y − ys)2 ≤ ρs}. (1)
The states of BL, R1, and R2 are respectively specified by
their Cartesian coordinates xB = (xB, yB), x1 = (x1, y1)
and x2 = (x2, y2). The players have constant speeds vB , v1,
and v2. The complete state of the differential game is defined
by x := (xB , yB, x1, y1, x2, y2) ∈ R6. The control variable
of BL is its instantaneous heading angle, uB = {θB}. The
interceptors affect the state of the game by choosing their
instantaneous headings, uR = {θ1, θ2}. The dynamics x˙ =
f(x, uB, uR) are specified by the system of linear differential
equations
x˙B = vB cos θB, xB(0) = xB0
y˙B = vB sin θB, yB(0) = yB0
x˙1 = v1 cos θ1, x1(0) = x10
y˙1 = v1 sin θ1, y1(0) = y10
x˙2 = v2 cos θ2, x2(0) = x20
y˙2 = v2 sin θ2, y2(0) = y20
(2)
where the admissible controls are the players’ headings
θB, θ1, θ2 ∈ [−pi, pi). The initial state of the system is defined
as
x0 := (xB0 , yB0 , x10 , y10 , x20 , y20) = x(t0).
In the attack stage we assume that BL flies at low speed
vB < v1 = v2. Define the speed ratio β = v1/vB > 1.
Without loss of generality, the speeds of the players are
normalized so v1 = v2 = β and vB = 1.
In this paper we consider the case where BL implements a
different speed than the red interceptors. Besides considering
players which do not necessarily have the same speed, this
work allows to implement tactics that consider survivability
and a sense of urgency as a key aspect. By flying at low speed
in the attack stage, BL is able to increase maneuverability at
the start of the retreat stage, then, BL increases its speed, and
successfully escapes from the attack by the red interceptors.
The target (or termination) set of the attack stage is
T := TΓ
⋃
TR (3)
where
TΓ :=
{
x |
√
(xB − xs)2 + (yB − ys)2 = ρs
}
(4)
represents the outcome where BL is able to reach the
engagement zone Γ before being blocked by the interceptors.
On the other hand
TR :=
{
x |
√
(xB − x1)2 + (yB − y1)2 = ρ
}
⋃ {
x |
√
(xB − x2)2 + (yB − y2)2 = ρ
} (5)
represents the outcome where at least one of the interceptors
is able to block BL from penetrating the defended area and
engage the asset Rs.
The differential game with termination set as given in (3)
belongs to the class of two termination set differential games
[26], [27]. The two termination set differential game concept
was introduced in order to extend classical pursuit-evasion
games where only one termination set is contemplated. For
instance, the pursuer tries to minimize the cost to reach the
termination set whereas the evader wants to maximize the
payoff to reach the termination set or, when possible, to avoid
reaching that set at all. The two termination set differential
game is useful in the analysis of combat games [28] where
the roles of pursuer and evader are not designated ahead
of time; instead each player wants to defeat the opponent
by terminating the game in its own termination set. In this
problem, BL strives to reach the engagement zone Γ before
being within distance ρ from any of the interceptors.
An important feature of this work is to leverage cooper-
ation between R1 and R2. In certain cases, it is possible
that individual optimal solutions of each interceptor against
BL do not block BL from reaching the engagement zone
Γ. However, if the interceptors cooperate they can find an
strategy that will successfully block BL from entering Γ. It
will be shown that, depending on the initial conditions, the
optimal strategy is for R1 and R2 to cooperate and block BL
simultaneously. In other words, the interceptors can block
BL the farthest from Rs when they achieve the engagement
range ρ exactly at the same time instant. The optimal strategy
of BL in such a case is to follow the same solution in order
to reach as close to Rs as possible. In the case where BL
reaches the engagement range ρ simultaneously with respect
to R1 and R2, he will fire a weapon against each interceptor
and retreat immediately.
Let RR ∈ R6 denote the red team winning subspace
where, under optimal play, the terminal condition is (5). The
terminal time tf is defined as the time instant when the state
of the system satisfies (5), at which time the terminal state is
xf := (xBf , yBf , x1f , y1f , x2f , y2f ) = x(tf ). The terminal
cost/payoff functional is
J(uB(t), uR(t); x0) = Φ(xf ) (6)
where
Φ(xf ) :=
√
(xBf − xs)2 + (yBf − ys)2. (7)
The cost/payoff functional depends only on the terminal state
- the capture game is a terminal cost/Mayer type game. Its
Value is given by
V (x0) := min
uB(·)
max
uR(·)
J(uB(·), uR(·); x0) (8)
subject to (2) and (5), where uB(·) and uR(·) are the players’
state feedback strategies.
The performance functional (7) is an important measure
of risk associated to this combat scenario. The interceptors
not only want to block BL from reaching Γ but they also
want to maximize the distance between BL terminal position
and the location of the protected asset Rs. Naturally, BL
aims at minimizing the same distance in order to approach
as close as possible to Rs before being forced to retreat.
The key feature of choosing the performance functional (7)
is that under non-optimal play by one of the teams, the
adversary can see an improvement in its performance and
actually change the outcome of the game. The state-feedback
saddle-point strategies of this differential game are necessary
in order to obtain the Nash equilibrium properties. Then,
BL is guaranteed to further decrease its terminal distance
with respect to Rs if the interceptors fail to implement their
optimal strategy. Under non-optimal play by the interceptors,
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Fig. 4. Relative coordinate frame where BL = (0, 0), R1 = (x
′
1
, 0),
R2 = (x′2, y
′
2
), and Rs = (x′s, y
′
s).
BL could potentially be able to reach Γ and actually win the
game by engaging the asset Rs. On the contrary, if BL does
not implement its optimal strategy, the interceptors will be
able to block him farther away from Rs reducing, in this
way, the threat to the protected asset Rs.
B. Cooperative Tactical Operations in the Attack Stage
In this section we consider the case where two red inter-
ceptors R1 and R2 wish to simultaneously combine forces
and block BL as far as possible from Rs.
Theorem 1: Consider the BVR differential game and as-
sume that x ∈ RR. The headings of the players BL, R1
and R2 are constant under optimal play and the optimal
trajectories are straight lines.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Since the optimal headings of each player are constant, the
dominance region of BL with respect to each interceptor is
delineated by a Cartesian Oval (CO). We consider, without
loss of generality, the relative coordinate frame shown in
Fig. 4, where BL is located at the origin. In this coordinate
frame we have that R1 is located on the positive x-axis; its
coordinates are given by R1 = (x
′
1, 0) where
x′1 =
√
(x1 − xB)2 + (y1 − yB)2
The positions of R2 and Rs are given by R2 = (x
′
2, y
′
2) and
Rs = (x
′
s, y
′
s) where
x′2 = d2 cos(λ2 − λ1)
y′2 = d2 sin(λ2 − λ1)
x′s = ds cos(λs − λ1)
y′s = ds sin(λs − λ1)
d2 =
√
(x2 − xB)2 + (y2 − yB)2, λ2 = arctan( y2−yBx2−xB ),
ds =
√
(xs − xB)2 + (ys − yB)2, λs = arctan( ys−yBxs−xB ),
and λ1 = arctan(
y1−yB
x1−xB
). In the relative coordinate frame,
the CO between BL and R1 is given by√
(x − x′1)2 + y2 = ρ+ β
√
x2 + y2 (9)
where β > 1 is the speed ratio and ρ > 0 is the engagement
distance between aircraft. Similarly, the CO between BL and
R2 is given by√
(x− x′2)2 + (y − y′2)2 = ρ+ β
√
x2 + y2 (10)
In the presence of two interceptors, the dominance region of
BL is given by the intersection of the two COs (9) and (10).
Let BL denote the dominance region of BL.
Figure 4 shows an interesting case where cooperation
between red interceptors is necessary in order to successfully
block BL. For instance, if only one of the interceptors
commits to block BL there is an strategy for BL to reach
Γ and being able to engage Rs. This is due to the fact that
each CO intersects the engagement zone Γ; however, if both
interceptors cooperate in order to block BL, then, they are
able to constrainBL’s dominance region. In this example, the
closest that BL can reach with respect to Γ is the intersection
point of both COs.
Let us define the orthogonal bisector of the segment R1R2
which is given by the equation y = mx+ n, where
m =
x′
1
−x′
2
y′
2
, n = − 12
x
′
2
1
−y
′
2
2
−x
′
2
2
y′
2
. (11)
In the following theorem we assume that simultaneous cap-
ture is the optimal play; then, the line y = mx + n passes
through the intersection of the two COs (9) and (10). Define
the functions
O(x) =
√
(x− x′1)2 + (mx+ n)2
−β
√
x2 + (mx+ n)2 − ρ (12)
and
J(x) =
√
(x′s − x)2 + (y′s −mx− n)2 (13)
Theorem 2: Cooperative blocking strategy. Consider the
attack stage of the BVR differential game and assume that
x ∈ RRs . The optimal headings of players BL, R1, and R2
in the relative coordinate frame are given by
cos θ∗B =
x∗√
x∗2+y∗2
sin θ∗B =
y∗√
x∗2+y∗2
cos θ∗1 =
x∗−x′
1√
(x∗−x′
1
)2+y∗2
sin θ∗1 =
y∗√
(x∗−x′
1
)2+y∗2
cos θ∗2 =
x∗−x′
2√
(x∗−x′
2
)2+(y∗−y′
2
)2
sin θ∗2 =
y∗−y′
2√
(x∗−x′
2
)2+(y∗−y′
2
)2
(14)
where y∗ = mx∗ + n and x∗ is given by
x∗ = argmin{J(xin1), J(xin2 )} (15)
where xin1 and xin2 are the solutions of the quartic equation
b2(1 +m2)2x4 + 4k3cx
3 + 4k2cx
2 + 4k1cx+ k0c = 0
(16)
which satisfy
{xin1 | O(xini ) = 0} (17)
for i = 1, 2. The coefficients of (16) are given by
k3c = b(1 +m
2)(bmn− x′1)
k2c =
b2n2(3m2+1)
2 − b(2mnx′1 + η(1+m
2)
2 )
+x
′2
1 − β2ρ2(1 +m2)
k1c = b
2mn3 − bn(nx′1 +mη) + x′1η − 2β2ρ2mn
k0c = (bn
2 − η)2 − (2βρn)2
(18)
where b = (1− β2) and η = ρ2 − x′21 .
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
It is important to note that in the presence of two inter-
ceptors, R1 and R2, simultaneous blocking of BL by both
interceptors is not always the optimal strategy. If (9) and (10)
do not intersect, then simultaneous blocking is clearly not the
optimal strategy. Furthermore, intersection of (9) and (10) is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for simultaneous
blocking of BL by R1 and R2.
In order to determine whether simultaneous capture or in-
dividual capture by one of the red interceptors is the optimal
strategy, we first need to determine the optimal strategies in
the one-on-one case. Without loss of generality consider R1
to be the participating red interceptor in the one-on-one case.
The obtained solution can be applied, separately, to each
one of the interceptors in order to determine the individual
optimal strategies and make the appropriate comparisons to
determine the overall optimal strategy. We consider the same
relative coordinate frame as in the previous theorem. Let
ζ = sign(y′s). Also, let cφ = cosφ and sφ = sinφ where
φ is the Line-of-sight (LOS) angle from BL to Rs in the
relative frame, that is, φ = λs − λ1.
Theorem 3: Consider the attack stage of the BVR differ-
ential game and assume that x ∈ RR. The optimal headings
of players BL and R1 in the relative coordinate frame are
given by the state-feedback policies
cos θ∗B =
x∗√
x∗2+y∗2
sin θ∗B =
y∗√
x∗2+y∗2
cos θ∗1 =
x∗−x′
1√
(x∗−x′
1
)2+y∗2
sin θ∗1 =
y∗√
(x∗−x′
1
)2+y∗2
(19)
where x∗ = r∗ cos θ∗, y∗ = ζr∗ sin θ∗, cos θ∗ =
br∗2−2βρr∗−η
2x′
1
r∗
, and sin θ∗ =
√
4x
′2
1
r∗2−[br∗2−2βρr∗−η]2
2x′
1
r∗
. The
optimal radius, r∗, is the solution of the sixth-order equation
k6r
6 + k5r
5 + k4r
4 + k3r
3 + k2r
2 + k1r + (βρη)
2 = 0
(20)
that minimizes the cost
J = d2s + r
2 − ds
x′
1
(
cφ[(1−β2)r∗2−2βρr∗− η]
+ sφ
√
4x
′2
1 r
2−[(1−β2)r∗2−2βρr∗− η]2) (21)
where
k1 = 4βρ[η(β
2ρ2−x′21 s2φ) + 12η2(
x′
1
ds
cφ−b)]
k2 = 2β
2ρ2[2β2ρ2−2x′21 (1+s2φ)+η(4x
′
1
ds
cφ−5b)]
+η2[b2 +
x′
1
ds
(
x′
1
ds
−2p)]+4x′21 s2φ(x
′2
1 +bη)
k3 = 4βρ
(
β2ρ2(2
x′
1
ds
cφ−3b)+bη(2b− 3x
′
1
ds
cφ)
+x
′2
1 [
η
d2s
+ b(2+s2φ)− 2x
′
1
ds
cφ]
)
k4 = β
2ρ2[13b2+4
x′
1
ds
(
x′
1
ds
−4p)]
−2(bη+2x′21 )[b2 + x
′
1
ds
(
x′
1
ds
−2p)]
k5 = −2bβρ[3b2 + x
′
1
ds
(2
x′
1
ds
− 5p)]
k6 = b
2[b2 +
x′
1
ds
(
x′
1
ds
− 2p)].
(22)
Also, b = (1− β2), η = ρ2 − x′21 , and p = bcφ.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix A.
Determining the optimal strategy. Based on the results of
the previous two theorems we now show how to determine
the optimal strategy in the case where (9) and (10) intersect
each other. The dominance region of BL is first obtained.
Let (I∗x , I
∗
y ) denote the cooperative intersection point; this
intersection point is obtained from Theorem 2. Then, the
individual solutions are computed. Let (x∗1, y
∗
1) and (x
∗
2, y
∗
2)
denote the individual aimpoints with respect to R1 and R2
(an additional change of coordinates is necessary to obtain
(x∗2, y
∗
2)); these aimpoints are obtained from Theorem 3.
Three cases may occur. Case 1) If (x∗i , y
∗
i ) /∈ BL for both
i = 1, 2, then, (I∗x , I
∗
y ) is the optimal solution. Case 2) If
(x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈ BL for only one i = 1 or i = 2, then, (x∗i , y∗i ) is
the optimal strategy. Case 3) If (x∗i , y
∗
i ) ∈ BL for both i = 1
and i = 2, then, the optimal strategy is given by (x∗, y∗)
such that y∗ = mx∗ + n and x∗ = argmin{J(x∗1), J(x∗2)}.
IV. THE RETREAT STAGE
A. Problem Formulation
In this section we consider the retreat stage which occurs
after BL is engaged by the interceptors. In the retreat stage,
BL is being pursued by two attacking missiles A1 and A2.
BW assists BL by firing two defending missiles D1 and D2
in order to intercept the attacking missiles and protect the
asset BL. The differential game of protecting a valuable asset
has been extensively addressed in the case of a cooperating
asset [19]. However, we are now faced with not one but
two pairs of attacking and defending missiles and it is
unclear how the asset is able to cooperate with both D1
and D2. In order to solve this problem we consider first
the differential game of a non-cooperative asset; in such a
case, BL executes a constant flight path route while a pair
of attacking and defending missiles play a differential game
of attacking/defending the asset BL. The same differential
game can be played by more pairs of attacking and defending
missiles. Then, a cost metric is devised in order to consider
all missiles and derive an optimal heading for BL which em-
ploys the solution of non-cooperative asset game as building
block.
Let us consider the non-cooperative asset BL = (xB , yB),
an attacking missile A = (xA, yA) and a defending missile
D = (xD, yD) in the fixed frame. B
′
Ls constant heading is
denoted by θB and it is known to both A and D. The speeds
of the players are constant they are denoted by vB , vA, and
vD, respectively. The agents have simple motion as it is com-
monly found in the games of Isaacs [13]. The complete state
of the game is defined by x := (xB, yB, xA, yA, xD, yD) ∈
R
6. We note that, although BL’s heading is constant during
the retreat stage, its state is still needed by the remaining
players to determine their optimal strategies. The Attacker’s
control variable is his instantaneous heading angle, uA =
{χ}. The Defender’s control variable is uD = {ψ}. The
dynamics x˙ = f(x, uA, uD) are defined by the system of
ordinary differential equations
x˙B = vB cos θB, xB(0) = xB0
y˙B = vB sin θB, yB(0) = yB0
x˙A = vA cosχ, xA(0) = xA0
y˙A = vA sinχ, yA(0) = yA0
x˙D = vD cosψ, xD(0) = xD0
y˙D = vD sinψ, yD(0) = yD0
(23)
where the admissible controls are given by χ, ψ ∈ [−pi, pi).
We assume that the missiles A and D have the same speed
while BL is slower than the missiles. Define the speed ratio
α = vB/vA < 1. The initial state of the system is defined
as
x0 := (xB0 , yB0 , xA0 , yA0 , xD0 , yD0) = x(t0).
The termination set is defined as follows
T := TA
⋃
TD (24)
where
TA =
{
x |
√
(xB − xA)2 + (yB − yA)2 = 0
}
(25)
represents the outcome where BL is captured by A. On the
other hand
TD :=
{
x |
√
(xD − xA)2 + (yD − yA)2 = 0
}
(26)
represents the outcome where A is intercepted by D before
A can capture BL.
In this section we focus on the case where A is suc-
cessfully intercepted by D. The opposing case will be
addressed in future research. Let RD ∈ R6 denote the
Defender’s winning subspace where, under optimal play,
A is successfully intercepted by D. The terminal time
tf is defined as the time instant when the state of the
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Derivation of optimal strategies
system satisfies (26), at which time the terminal state is
xf := (xBf , yBf , xAf , yAf , xDf , yDf ) = x(tf ). The termi-
nal cost/payoff functional is
J(uA(t), uD(t), x0) = Φ(xf ) (27)
where
Φ(xf ) :=
√
(xAf − xBf )2 + (yAf − yBf )2. (28)
The cost/payoff functional depends only on the terminal state
- the ATDDG is a terminal cost/Mayer type game. Its Value
is given by
V (x0) := min
uA(·)
max
uD(·)
J(uA(·), uD(·); x0) (29)
subject to (23) and (26), where uA(·) and uD(·) are the
players’ state feedback strategies.
Corollary 1: Consider the retreat stage of the BVR dif-
ferential game and assume that x ∈ RD. The headings of
the players A and D are constant under optimal play and
the optimal trajectories are straight lines.
B. Optimal Strategies in the Retreat Stage
Without loss of generality we analyze this problem using
the relative coordinate frame shown in Fig. 5. In this coor-
dinate frame we have that D = (0, 0), A = (x′A, 0), and
BL = (x
′
B , y
′
B). The locations of the agents in the relative
coordinate frame can be readily obtained from the positions
of the agents in the fixed frame as follows
x′A =
√
(xA − xD)2 + (yA − yD)2
x′B = dB cos(λB − λA)
y′B = dB sin(λB − λA)
where dB =
√
(xB − xD)2 + (yB − yD)2, λB =
arctan( yB−yD
xB−xD
), and λA = arctan(
yA−yD
xA−xD
). Also define
xm =
1
2x
′
A.
Theorem 4: Consider the retreat stage of the BVR differ-
ential game and assume that x ∈ RD. The Defender is able
to intercept the Attacker before the latter captures BL if θB
is such that
θB ∈ [θ + λA, θ¯ + λA] (30)
where θ = arctan(
y−y′B
xm−x
′
B
), θ¯ = arctan(
y¯−y′B
xm−x
′
B
), and
y =
y′B+
√
α2[(x′
B
−x′
A
)2+y
′2
B
]−[(1−α2)xm−x′B+α
2x′
A
]2
1−α2
y¯ =
y′B−
√
α2[(x′B−x
′
A)
2+y
′2
B ]−[(1−α
2)xm−x′B+α
2x′A]
2
1−α2
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
Since we assume that x ∈ RD , there exist a non-empty
set of heading angles such that BL is able to escape. In other
words, the Apollonius circle between A and BL intersects
the line x = xm. Then, the Game of Degree is played in the
winning region of the asset/defender team for some fixed θB
such that (30) holds, where the objective functional is (27).
Theorem 5: Consider the retreat stage of the BVR differ-
ential game. Assume that BL moves with constant heading
θB . The state-feedback optimal strategies of A and D in the
relative coordinate frame are given, respectively, by
cosχ∗ =
xm−x
′
A√
(xm−x′A)
2+y∗2
sinχ∗ = y
∗√
(xm−x′A)
2+y∗2
cosψ∗ = xm√
x2m+y
∗2
sinψ∗ = y
∗√
x2m+y
∗2
(31)
where y∗ is the solution of the following quartic equation
c4y
4 + 2c3y
3 + c2y
2 + 2c1y + c0 = 0 (32)
which minimizes the cost
J = (dm + α
√
x2m + y
2)2 + (y − ym)2
−2(y − ym)(dm + α
√
x2m + y
2) cosϕ.
(33)
The coefficients of (32) are given by
c4 = (2α cosϕ)
2 − (1 + α2)2
c3 = y
′
B + α
2[(1−2 cos2 ϕ)ym − dm cosϕ]
c2 = α
2[(dm+ym cosϕ)
2 + (2xm cosϕ)
2]
−y′2B − x2m(1 + α2)2
c1 = y
′
Bx
2
m + α
2x2mym sin
2 φ)
c0 = (αx
2
m cosϕ)
2 − x2my
′2
B
where ϕ = θB − pi2 − λA, dm =
xm−x
′
B
sinϕ , and ym = y
′
B −
dm cosϕ.
Proof. The proof is provided in Appendix B.
C. Cooperative Strategy of Blue Leader
Given a heading that guarantees escape, i.e. θB satisfies
(30), the results in Theorem 4 and Theorem 5 can be used
to obtain the optimal strategies of each separate pair of
attacking and defending missiles. In addition, BL can search
for an optimal heading that balances off a linear combination
of the terminal costs associated to each separate game. This
is achieved as explained in the remaining of this section.
Consider BL being pursued by two attacking missiles A1
and A2. BW assists BL by firing two defending missiles D1
and D2. We first apply Theorem 4 to each pair of attacking-
defending missiles. From the A1−D1 pair we obtain θ1 and
θ¯1 and from the A2 −D2 pair we obtain θ2 and θ¯2. Thus,
the feasible heading of BL, in order to successfully escape
from both A1 and A2, is such that
θB ∈ [θl, θu] (34)
where θl = max{θ1 + λA1 , θ2 + λA2}, θu = min{θ¯1 +
λA1 , θ¯2 + λA2}, λA1 = arctan( yA1−yD1xA1−xD1 ), and λA2 =
arctan(
yA2−yD2
xA2−xD2
).
In order to optimally evade both A1 and A2, we define
the objective functional
Jc(θB) = wV1(x1, θB) + (1 − w)V2(x2, θB) (35)
for parameter w ∈ (0, 1) and subject to θB ∈ [θl, θu].
Also, x1 = (xB , yB, xA1 , yA1 , xD1 , yD1) and x2 =
(xB , yB, xA2 , yA2 , xD2 , yD2). Clearly, BL tries to maximize
(35).
In order to obtain Vi(xi, θB), for i = 1, 2, we apply the
results of Theorem 5, that is, Vi(xi, θB) is the Value of the
game played by Ai and Di given some θB ∈ [θl, θu]. Hence,
a numerical search can be performed over the admissible set
of heading values θB ∈ [θl, θu] in order to maximize (35).
In summary, the results of the differential games, one for
each pair of attacking-defending missiles, are used by BL
in order to cooperate with both defenders and maximize a
linear combination of both terminal distances.
V. EXAMPLES
Consider the initial positions BL0 = (−6, 8), BW0 =
(−7.4, 6.2), R10 = (15, 14), and R20 = (16, 6.5). The red
stationary asset is located at Rs = (15.5, 10). The air-to-air
firing range is ρ = 5.0 and the air-to-ground firing range
is ρs = 7. During the attack stage we have that vB = 1
and v1 = v2 = 1.25; hence, the speed ratio parameter is
β = 1.25. Solving the attack stage using simple motion
dynamics we obtain that the Value of the game in this stage
is V = 13.9870.
We are interested in applying these results to a more real-
istic case where the vehicles exhibit turning rate constraints.
We employ the typical first-order model dynamics [29] which
is described as follows.
x˙i = vi cos θi, xi(0) = xi0
y˙i = vi sin θi, yi(0) = yi0
θ˙i =
1
τi
(θci − θi), θi(0) = θi0 .
(36)
for i = B, 1, 2. We consider the parameters τB = 0.14
and τ1 = τ2 = 0.12. The procedure to apply the results in
this paper to the models in (36) is as follows. The optimal
strategies obtained in this paper return the optimal headings
θ∗i for each player i = B, 1, 2. We now make θci(t) = θ
∗
i (t)
in order to guide each player to acquire its own optimal
heading. The optimal heading is expected to be time-varying,
even when all players implement their optimal strategies,
since the players are now constrained on how fast they can
-5 0 5 10 15
x
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
y
14.6 14.8 15 15.2
13.6
13.8
14
15.8 16 16.2
6.4
6.6
6.8
B
L
B
W
R
s
R
1
R
1
R
2
R
2
Fig. 6. Attack Stage. Trajectories with zoom in view about the initial paths
of the red interceptors
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
θ
B
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-3
-2
-1
0
θ
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
t
0
1
2
3
4
θ
2
Fig. 7. Attack Stage. Heading profiles
turn. At each time instant, each player uses the current state
of the game in order to update its optimal control heading.
Fig. 6 shows the trajectories during the attack stage where
players BL, R1, and R2 aim at the optimal blocking point
which is given by the intersection of the two Cartesian Ovals.
However, at the start of the engagement, the red interceptors
have a significant initial heading disadvantage with respect to
the blue UAVs. This is illustrated in the zoom in plots within
Fig. 6. In addition, the heading profiles of BL, R1 and R2
are shown in Fig. 7 where it can be seen that R1 and R2
take a harder turn than BL at the start of the engagement.
The red interceptors are nevertheless able to simultaneously
block BL and the terminal separation between BL and Rs is
J = 13.9052 which is just slightly smaller than the Value of
the game. The effects of turning rate constraint are negligible
at the BVR range.
We now consider the retreat stage of the differential game.
At the end of the attack stage, both interceptors reach a
distance ρ within BL simultaneously and BL launches an
attack against the interceptors and retreats. R1 and R2 fire
one missile each against BL from their position at the end
of the attack stage; these missiles are denoted by A1 and
A2 in Fig. 8. BW fires two missiles to protect BL from its
position at the end of the attack stage which are denoted by
D1 and D2. The positions of the players at the end of the
attack stage which is also the beginning of the retreat stage
are denoted by ∗ marks. Note that the retreat stage takes
place at a significant closer range than the attack stage.
For the retreat stage, BL includes the sense of urgency
and retreats at higher speed. BL increases its speed from
vB = 1 in the attack stage to vB = 1.5 in the retreat stage.
The missiles speed in this example is vA = vD = 3 and
the speed ratio parameter, when BL flies at max speed, is
α = 0.5. In order to avoid the attacking missiles flying near
its teammate, BW , we include an additional constraint on
the optimal heading of BL during the retreat stage. This is
done by restricting BL to turn in the direction opposite to
the location of BW . Then, in this example, the additional
constraint is θB < θ
a
Bf
+pi, where θaBf is the heading of BL
at the end of the attack stage. In this example, the optimal
heading of BL is θ
∗
B = 3.1956 which is equal to the imposed
constraint. The Value of the game in the retreat stage, for
parameter w = 0.5 and assuming all vehicles have simple
motion, is V = 3.2442.
In the trajectories shown in Fig. 8 we apply the results
obtained in Section IV to the case where BL has both
turning rate constraints and acceleration constraints. The
attacker missiles are intercepted at different times, A2 is
intercepted about 0.1 seconds earlier than A1. Fig. 8 shows
the complete trajectory of BL, until A1 is intercepted. BL’s
speed profile is given by the first-order dynamical model
v˙B =
1
τBv
(vcB − vB) where τBv = 0.2. The cost in
this case where turning rate and acceleration constraints are
considered is Jc = 2.9308 which is smaller than the Value
of the game. The heading and speed profile of BL are shown
in Fig. 9.
The duration of the retreat stage is much shorter than
that of the attack stage and the engagement occurs at closer
range than the engagement at the attack stage. Additionally,
BL is not only subject to turning rate constraints but also
to acceleration constraints. These are the main reasons for
the decrease in performance by BL. The approach and the
strategies obtained assuming simple motion models work
well for the retreat stage and they are robust with respect
to constraints which are not modeled in the problem for-
mulation. The defenders are able to react to the variations
introduced by the dynamic constraints of BL and intercept
the attackers by implementing the obtained state-feedback
strategies. The performance variation, although smaller than
10%, is not negligible as it was in the attack stage.
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In future work we plan to address the retreat stage, with
BL’s turning rate and acceleration constraints, in more detail.
We note that a model of a player with four states, with
heading and speed included as states, significantly compli-
cates the analysis. Only open-loop numerical solutions are
usually obtained when considering this kind of model. Since
open-loop solutions are not useful for implementation in the
type of attack and defense problem under consideration. We
plan to approach the problem by analyzing the heading and
speed profiles of the players and updating the state-feedback
strategies according to the current values of the parameters.
For instance, the current speed of BL can be used to update
the speed ratio parameter and, in turn, update the state-
feedback strategies of the players. Since the Value of the
game obtained while assuming simple motion models is not
achievable,BL cannot instantaneously acquire its max speed,
the proposed analysis will provide a better approximation of
the achievable value of the game and a refinement of the
optimal strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper formulated an operational relevant combat
scenario in the Beyond Visual Range as a two-team, zero-
sum differential game. This game consists of two stages: the
attack stage and the retreat stage. The optimal strategies of
each stage were obtained in this paper. In the attack stage,
these strategies leveraged cooperative actions between agents
of the same team in order to prevent an opposing player
from reaching the engagement zone of the protected asset
and minimizing risk by blocking enemies the farthest away
from the asset. In the retreat stage, the active target defense
paradigm was used and extended in order consider two pairs
of attacking and defending missiles and for the target to
cooperate with its two defenders.
APPENDIX A. PROOFS OF ATTACK STAGE
Proof of Theorem 1. The Hamiltonian of the differential
game is
H = κxB cos θB + κyB sin θB + βκx1 cos θ1
+ βκy1 sin θ1 + βκx2 cos θ2 + βκy2 sin θ2
(37)
where κ = (κxB ,κyB ,κx1 ,κy1 ,κx2 ,κy2) is the vector
of co-states. Note that the Hamiltonian and the dynamics
are separable (or decoupled) in the controls θB and θR.
Hence, minθB maxθ1,θ2 H = maxθ1,θ2 minθB H and Isaacs’
condition holds.
The optimal control inputs in terms of the co-state vari-
ables are obtained from Isaacs’ Main Equation 1 (ME 1)
min
θB
max
θ1,θ2
H = 0 (38)
and they are characterized by the relationships
cos θ∗B = −
κxB√
κ
2
xB
+κ2yB
, sin θ∗B = −
κyB√
κ
2
xB
+κ2yB
cos θ∗1 =
κx1√
κ
2
x1
+κ2y1
, sin θ∗1 =
κy1√
κ
2
x1
+κ2y1
cos θ∗2 =
κx2√
κ
2
x2
+κ2y2
, sin θ∗2 =
κy2√
κ
2
x2
+κ2y2
(39)
The co-state dynamics are obtained from κ˙ = −∂H
∂x
which
results in: κ˙xB = κ˙yB = κ˙x1 = κ˙y1 = κ˙x2 = κ˙y2 = 0;
hence, all co-states are constant and we have that the optimal
headings θ∗B , θ
∗
1 and θ
∗
2 are constant as well. 
Proof of Theorem 2. In order to determine the intersection
points of the COs (9) and (10), we substitute the generic
coordinates (x, y) by (Ix, Iy), the coordinates of the inter-
section points into these two equations. Hence, we have that
√
(Ix − x′1)2 + I2y =
√
(Ix − x′2)2 + (Iy − y′2)2
that is, the distance between the current position of R1
and the intersection point I is the same as the distance
between the current position of R2 and the intersection point
I . Therefore, the intersection point lies on the orthogonal
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bisector of the segment R1R2 which is defined by y =
mx+ n where m and n are given by (11).
It is possible to obtain the intersections of y = mx + n
with either (9) or (10). Without loss of generality, consider
(9). Taking the square of both sides of (9) and rearranging
terms we obtain
b(x2 + y2)− 2x′1x− η = 2βρ
√
x2 + y2.
Once again, taking the square of both sides of the previous
equation and combining like terms we arrive at
b2(y4 + x4)− 4bx′1x3 + 4[ b
2x2
2 − b(x′1x+ η2 )− β2ρ2]y2
+4(x
′2
1 − bη2 − β2ρ2)x2 + 4x′1ηx+ η2 = 0.
Now, substitute y = mx + n into the previous equation.
Combining like terms, we obtain the quartic equation (16)
with coefficients given by (18).
By taking the square of the previous equations, additional
ovals are introduced. In general, each Cartesian Oval consists
of two ovals: the inner oval and the outer oval. However, for
each case, (9) and (10), the applicable oval is the inner oval.
This is due to the fact that points on the outer ovals do not
satisfy the capture conditions (9) or (10).
If the four solutions of (16) are real, then, the line y =
mx + n intersects both the inner ovals the outer ovals.
However, the outer oval is irrelevant and we discard those
solutions by imposing the condition (17). Thus, the solutions
xin1 and xin2 correspond to the two intersection points of
the inner ovals (9) and (10). The optimal intersection is the
closest to the red asset Rs and the optimal headings are given
by (14). Finally, the optimal headings in the fixed frame, θ∗if ,
are simply given by θ∗if = θ
∗
i + λ1, for i = B, 1, 2. 
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider the definition of the
Cartesian Oval (9) rewritten in radial form
rˆ = βr + ρ. (40)
Without loss of generality we consider the configuration in
Fig. 10. Using the law of cosines, we have that for any point
on the Cartesian Oval
cos θ =
r2−rˆ2+x
′
2
1
2rx′
1
.
In addition, sin θ = 12rx′
1
√
4x
′2
1 r
2 − (r2 − rˆ2 + x′21 )2. The
distance d is given by
J(r) = d2 = d2s + r
2 − 2dsr cos(φ− θ)
= d2s + r
2 − ds
x′
1
(
cosφ(r2 − rˆ2 + x′21 )
+ sinφ
√
4x
′2
1 r
2 − (r2 − rˆ2 + x′21 )2
)
.
(41)
Since BL is not able to reach Γ, the optimal strategy is for
BL to be blocked at the closest point with respect to Γ; since
Γ is a circular region with center at Rs, the closest point to
Γ is equivalent to the closest point to Rs. Such a point can
be obtained by taking the derivative of (41) with respect to
r and setting the result equal to zero as follows
dJ(r)
dr
= 2r − 2ds
x′
1
(
(r − βrˆ) cosφ
+ sinφ
2x
′
2
1
r−(r2−rˆ2+x
′
2
1
)(r−βrˆ)√
4x
′2
1
r2−(r2−rˆ2+x
′2
1
)2
)
= 0
(42)
where, from (40), drˆ
dr
= β. Equation (42) can be written in
the following form
sinφ
(
2x
′2
1 r − (r2 − rˆ2 + x
′2
1 )(r − βrˆ)
)
=(
(r − βrˆ) cosφ− x′1
ds
r
)√
4x
′2
1 r
2 − (r2 − rˆ2 + x′21 )2.
(43)
Taking the square of both sides of equation (43) and rear-
ranging terms we obtain the following
(r2−rˆ2+x′21 )2
(
(r−βrˆ)[(1− 2x′1
ds
cosφ)r−βrˆ]+ x
′
2
1
d2s
r2
)
+4x
′2
1 r(r − βrˆ)
(
(
2x′
1
ds
cosφ−1)r2 + (rˆ2−x′21 ) sin2 φ
+ rrˆβ cos2 φ
)
+ 4x
′4
1 r
2(sin2 φ− r2
d2s
) = 0
(44)
In order to simplify the notation, let cφ = cosφ and
sφ = sinφ. We substitute (40) into (44) in order to write
the equation in terms of only one variable, r. We have the
following
(
(1−β2)2r4−4(1−β2)βρr3+2[2β2ρ2−(1−β2)η]r2
+4βρηr+η2
)(
[(1−β2)2− 2x′1
ds
(1−β2)cφ+ x
′
2
1
d2s
]r2
+ 2βρ[
x′
1
ds
cφ−(1−β2)]r + β2ρ2
)
+4x
′2
1 r
(
(1−β2)r−βρ
)(
[
2x′
1
ds
cφ−(1−β2)]r2
+ βρ(1+s2φ)r+ηs
2
φ
)
+ 4x
′4
1 r
2(s2φ − r
2
d2s
) = 0
Finally, expanding the terms in the previous equation and
combining like terms we arrive at the sixth-order equation
(20) with coefficients given by (22). Note that, due to sym-
metry of the Cartesian Oval about the x-axis, two possible
points in the Cartesian Oval exist for any given radius r:
x = r cos θ, and y = ±r sin θ. For the optimal solution, r∗,
the minimum is achieved on the same side, with respect to
the x-axis, of the Cartesian Oval as the location of Rs; then,
we have that x∗ = r∗ cos θ∗, and y∗ = ζr∗ sin θ∗.
Note that complex roots and real roots of (20) outside
the range of the inner Cartesian Oval r ∈ [r, r¯] can be
automatically discarded. The values r =
x′
1
−ρ
β+1 and r¯ =
x′
1
−ρ
β−1
are, respectively, the smallest and largest values of r that
satisfy the inner Cartesian Oval equation shown in (40).
Consider the Cartesian Oval equation, inner and outer oval,
in the following form
(1− β2)r2 − 2(βρ+ x′1 cos θ)r − η = 0 (45)
The inner oval is given by
rin(θ)=
βρ+x′
1
cos θ−
√
(βρ+x′
1
cos θ)2+(1−β2)η
1−β2
(46)
and the outer oval by
rout(θ)=
βρ+x′
1
cos θ+
√
(βρ+x′
1
cos θ)2+(1−β2)η
1−β2
(47)
and we obtain r when we make θ = 0 in (46). Similarly,
the largest value of r is obtained when θ = pi in (46). Thus,
0 < r ≤ rin(θ) ≤ r¯.
Furthermore, the roots of (20) also include the radii
corresponding to points in the outer oval (the outer oval is
shown in Fig. 10 in gray tone) that minimize and maximize
the distance with respect to the target pointRs. We now make
θ = 0 in (47) and we obtain rout(θ = 0) =
x′
1
+ρ
1−β < 0. Also,
rout(θ = pi) = −x
′
1
+ρ
1+β < 0. In this case,
x′
1
+ρ
1−β ≤ rout(θ) ≤
−x′1+ρ1+β < 0. Therefore, rout < 0 while rin > 0 and at least
two roots of (20) fall outside the inner oval range, that is,
rout /∈ [r, r¯] and they can be discarded. 
APPENDIX B. PROOFS OF RETREAT STAGE
Proof of Theorem 4. We determine the range of headings
of BL that guarantee successful interception of A by D by
studying the dominance regions of the players. Since A is
faster than BL, their dominance regions are separated by the
Apollonius circle
(x− x′B−α2x′A1−α2 )2 + (y−
y′B
1−α2 )
2 = α2
(x′B−x
′
A)
2+y
′
2
B
1−α2
(48)
as it is shown in Fig. 5.a. Now, the dominance regions
between A and D are separated by the orthogonal bisector of
the segment AD which is given by the line x = xm. Hence,
BL can escape by reaching the dominance region of D; in
that way, D is able to aid him by intercepting A. The safe
segment of the line x = xm that BL should aim at is delin-
eated by the intersection of the Apollonius circle (48) with
that line. Substituting x = xm into (48) and solving for y we
obtain the two intersection points y and y¯. The corresponding
headings in the relative coordinate frame are given by θ and
θ¯. Finally, accounting for the rotation by λA used to obtain
the relative coordinate frame, we obtain the condition for
successful interception of A by D in the fixed frame given
in (30). 
Proof of Theorem 5. Interception of A by D occurs at
a point on the boundary of their dominance regions, which
is the line x = xm. Consider the triangle BmBfI shown in
Fig. 5.b, where Bm = (xm, ym), Bf is the terminal position
of BL, and I = (xm, y) is the interception point in terms of
the optimization variable y.
Note that the distance traversed by BL is equal to αtf =
α
√
x2m + y
2. The terminal distance between A and BL is
given by
J(y) = BmBf
2
+ (y − ym)2 − 2(y − ym)BmBf cosϕ.
Additionally, we have that BmBf = dm +α
√
x2m + y
2 and
J(y) can be written as shown in (33). Note that dm < 0 if
BL is initially located on the A-side of the line x = xm and
dm > 0 otherwise.
Let us take the derivative of (33) with respect to y and set
it equal to zero as follows
dJ(y)
dy
=
2α(dm+α
√
x2m+y
2)√
x2m+y
2
y + 2(y − ym)
−2 cosϕ[ α(y−ym)√
x2m+y
2
y + dm + α
√
x2m + y
2] = 0.
Multiplying both sides of the previous equation by√
x2m + y
2 and rearranging terms we obtain
[(1 + α2)y − (ym + dm cosϕ)]
√
x2m + y
2
= α[2 cosϕy2 − (dm + ym cosϕ)y + x2m cosϕ]
Taking the square of both sides of the previous equations and
combining like terms we obtain the quartic equation shown
in (32). 
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